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Abstract 
Is the state on the retreat? We examine this question through an analysis of changing patterns of govern-
ment involvement in infrastructure provision, which is generally considered to be one of the primary 
functions of the modern state. Based on an analysis of the extent of privatization of infrastructure compa-
nies between 1970 and 2000 across twenty-six OECD countries, we find that there is indeed a general 
trend towards less public infrastructure provision visible in all of the countries and that the main factors 
associated with the extent of privatizations are EU membership and government ideology. We argue that 
the trend of privatizing infrastructure companies was triggered by a change of the prominent economic 
discourse in the 1970s and that a rightist party ideology and EU membership fostered the adoption and 
implementation of these ideas in domestic settings.  
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1. Introduction  
Few other topics in political and social science are currently as hotly discussed as the changing 
position of the state in a world where markets and production processes become increasingly global 
and new centers of political power emerge above and beneath the nation-state. Some scholars point 
to “power shifts” (Mathews 1997) and “post-national constellations” (Habermas 2001) or even herald 
the end of the nationstate (Guéhenno 1995, Ohmae 1995). Others relegate such alarmist accounts to 
the realm of fables and myths (Weiss 1998). Research on “the state of the state” therefore appears as 
an “uncertain science” showing some parallels with the dispute on global warming: on one side of 
the spectrum there are scholars who strongly believe in big changes and derive far-reaching conclu-
sions. On the other side, there is deep skepticism about whether this phenomenon exists at all. There 
is even a broad dispute about the factors contributing to this disturbing development among the 
believers in the theory of the decline of the state. The literature here is exhaustive and reviews fill 
long lists (Berger 2000, de Vries 2001, Genschel 2004, Guillén 2001, O’Riain 2000, Schulze and Ur-
sprung 1999).  
The present paper aims to investigate whether the presumed transformation of the state is real, 
and what role Europeanization plays in this process. We understand the latter as a regional pooling 
of supranational power, an expanding internal market and related policy harmonization among the 
members of this community (Schneider and Werle 2007). Is Europeanization one of the major con-
tributing factors? Is it rather an attenuating force? Or is the “net effect” negligible after all? We con-
ceive changes in state ownership of important social and economic infrastructures as an important 
indicator for a changing position of the state. Many scholars measure the size of the state by govern-
ment expenditure as a percentage of GDP -the “ratio of the state” (Staatsquote), as it is called in Ger-
man (Blais et al. 1993, Miller and Moe 1983). However, to remain with the analogy of global warming, 
this is somewhat like measuring a society’s “average temperature.” In contrast, to measure the state’s 
property space would correspond to observing the expansion and contraction of polar ice caps. This 
implies that we regard the provision of infrastructure as a traditional stronghold of the state, and 
major changes at this level as important evidence for a changing position. In more technical terms, 
we are conducting a statistical analysis of the extent of public property in the area of key infrastruc-
tures in the time period between 1983 and 2000 for twenty-six OECD countries.  
The article is structured as follows: in a first section the evolution of state activities in general, 
and state ownership of infrastructures in particular, will be described by two statistical indicators. 
Subsequently we shall discuss different theories of privatization and market expansion, Europeani-
zation and globalization. In the final part we introduce an integrated explanatory model to be tested 
by multiple regression analysis. The results of our analysis nourish serious doubts about the validity 
of the widespread hypothesis that the current transformation of the state is a direct and inevitable 
consequence of globalization. Instead, our findings attribute a decisive role for the retreat of the state 
from public infrastructures to the diffusion of ideas and policy models. 
2. The State of the State  
How can we obtain systematic evidence that the position of the state in modern society is 
really weakening? To measure the state is not an easy task, since it is an enormously complex object 
of investigation. In modern societies the state has become an encompassing “metaorganization” 
(Lehman 1988) including not only a broad variety of components and organizational levels, but also 
multiplex internal structures and complex dependencies in its social environment (Leibfried and 
Zuern 2005). Although the forms and structures of contemporary states vary considerably, in mod-
ern societies it is still the core of the political system and the backbone of a country’s social organiza-  3
tion. To claim that this central political institution would decline or even dissipate in a rather short 
period implies a heavy burden of proof. This would suppose that we can measure at least three in-
stances of “state power” and its changes over time:  
1) The power of nation states vis-à-vis other competing centers of power (e.g., international or-
ganizations, multinational companies, etc.). Such measurement would be extremely difficult and 
does not yet exist on a broad basis in social science. A proxy measure could be power reputation 
and centrality (as it is often used in social network analysis) of various categories of public and 
private actors in inter-and transnational policymaking processes. However, such measures also 
only exist for very few areas and cases.  
2) The weight of state activities within the overall transactions and interactions conducted in a 
given society. Since such a “panoptical” measurement is impossible, an indicator that comes close 
to this measure is the above mentioned “ratio of the state.” It measures economic processes that 
“go through” the state (expenditures) as a proportion of the GDP. Related indicators would be 
public employment or the number and scope of regulations that are issued and implemented by 
the state.  
3) The number of societal key areas that the state is controlling through its capacity to make bind-
ing decisions. This is also difficult to measure, but our analysis of public property in key infra-
structural sectors comes close to such a positional indicator.  
2.1 State size and control of key infrastructures  
In the following, we will describe the evolution of the state’s position using two indicators: 
government expenditures and public infrastructural property. The latter measures the average per-
centage of state ownership of the main airline and the dominant enterprises in the telecommunica-
tions and electricity sector of a country – we call this the public infrastructure ratio. It is evident that 
this is only a proxy measure for a state position in the provision of infrastructural services in gen-
eral. In addition, the indicator points solely to the direct involvement of the state in this function, it 
does not mean that direct state control could not be replaced by other means of more indirect state 
influence such as regulation, for example (Grande 1994, Majone 1997, Vogel 1996).  
Based on this approach we constructed a comprehensive data set of twenty-six OECD countries 
for the period from 1970 through 2000 (Schneider et al. 2004). The data were described in detail in 
recent publications of the research group (Schneider et al. 2005, Schneider and Tenbücken 2004). For 
reasons of comparability, the countries include the most developed industrial nations without the 
transformation countries where infrastructure privatization is largely over-determined by a trans-
formation of the overall political and economic system. Data on governmental expenditures are 
based on OECD statistics (OECD 2002a, b).    4
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Figure 1: Average state expenditure and infrastructure ownership, 1970-2000 
An overview of the evolution of both indicators of state development is offered in Figure 1. Its 
most important message is that there was an end of state growth in the early eighties. After the two 
ratios reached a climax at that time, both declined during the following years, with the negative ex-
penditure trend being less clear-cut. Although it would be premature to speak of a clear reversal of 
the expenditures’ growth trend, it is very characteristic that, despite a further increase in the early 
1990s, the average expenditure rate in 2000 fell back to the level of the early 1980s. However, the re-
duction of the infrastructure ratio is unambiguous. It sank continually from 82 percent in 1983 to 
under 41 percent in the year 2000, which corresponds to a relative decline of 50 percent. An examina-
tion of the developments in individual countries confirms this view. All states withdrew at least par-
tially from their infrastructural sectors by the year 2000. No country substantially expanded its infra-
structure property since the mid-eighties and nineties.  
In Figure 2, the development for the three different sectors is depicted. It shows that change in 
telecommunications was the most profound, but we can also see a remarkable decline in the other 
two sectors. The retreat-of-the-state hypothesis thus can be maintained at least with respect to this 
specific societal domain. However, the importance of this transformation should not be underesti-
mated. It happened in key sectors which even economic liberals — such as Adam Smith — have 
taken for granted as core functions of the state.  
But state retreat (Strange 1996) does not necessarily mean state decline in the sense that the na-
tion-state has become powerless. With less control over infrastructures, less involvement in the 
economy, and a smaller workforce, the state still can have significant monitoring, regulatory and 
coercive powers. Interestingly, the same technology which drives globalization is also enhancing 
state power. New communication and information technologies undoubtedly contributed to the 
“control revolution” (Beniger 1986, Schneider 2004b). Diverse technologies have evolved (remote 
sensing, biometric identification, data mining technologies, etc.) that provide security apparatuses 
with a spectrum of new surveillance technologies which undoubtedly increases the power of the 
state (the “surveillance state,” see Brzezinski 2004).    5
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Figure 2: Infrastructure ownership by sector, 1970-2000  
In a more indirect way digital technology allowed for the development of new control tech-
nologies that facilitated the assignment of private property rights into new areas. But property rights 
are not self-enforcing, they depend on authoritative capacities. While self-regulatory arrangements 
are also imaginable within certain businesses, some functional advantages of public regimes in prop-
erty protection may speak for a stronger governmental engagement at this level. It is quite plausible 
that giant corporations, which often appear as the antagonists of ntion-states, are not interested in 
being surrounded by “dwarf states” from a long-term perspective (Evans 1997).  
2.2 Privatization profiles  
So far we have looked at the big picture. If we follow the changes of state activity in individual 
countries, however, we find very different “fever charts.” A comparison of our three sectoral devel-
opments among the countries shows that there is only one pair of countries that has experienced an 
almost identical development (Sweden and Norway). This form of similarity analysis is carried out 
with two methods of data reduction. An initial step is the pair wise computation of profile similari-
ties on the basis of Manhattan Distance (sum of absolute differences). Hierarchical cluster analysis 
then allows us to classify the countries with respect to their profile similarity (Everitt et al. 2001). A 
non-metrical version of multidimensional scaling (MDS) locates the countries in a two-dimensional 
landscape in such a way, that the rank order of geometrical distances represent the similarity of their 
property profiles (Borg and Groenen 2005). Figure 3 represents a combination of both methods: on 
the left side, the clusters are depicted in a dendrogram, on the right side by combining MDS with a 
Venn diagram (see for instance Everitt, 2001: 31-3). In the latter points (countries) are located by MDS 
whereas circles represent clusters.   6
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Figure 3: Patterns of infrastructure privatization (MDS and Cluster Analysis) 
In this figure it is shown that the country profiles differ with respect to each other in various 
degrees. If the United States, having private structures from the very beginning, is excluded from the 
analysis, the country that shows the most dissimilar development profile to all other countries is the 
United Kingdom. It transformed the property structures in all three sectors in a very short time.  
3. Theories and Hypotheses  
How can this spatial retreat of the state be explained? Which theories provide convincing in-
terpretations of this transformation process? In our opinion, there are at least four relevant theoreti-
cal perspectives that explain the phenomenon by rather different mechanisms:  
1) The Marxist perspective conceives privatization as commodification, the transfer of non-
commodities such as common or public goods into commodities, money and capital. In this case 
infrastructures become integrated into the capitalist mode of production, which tries to absorb all 
other co-existing modes of production into the circuit of capital accumulation, thus subsuming all 
social activities under the “logic of capital.” This mechanism was outlined in detail by Marx 
(Marx and Engels 1887) and by Luxemburg (1964). A new version of this perspective has recently 
been presented by Hardt and Negri (2000). It is important to note that not only economic but also 
political processes – persuasion, coercion, etc. – are involved in the expansion process of the logic 
of capital from this perspective. The state plays an active complementary role – either as stabiliz-
ing mechanism or as an instrument of expansion into areas not yet integrated.  
2) The transaction-cost perspective views privatization, when combined with liberalization (i.e., 
removal of market restrictions), as an expansion of market-coordination. Markets are conceived as 
specific social coordination mechanisms beyond authority or hierarchy, and their expansion or 
contraction is nonpolitical and primarily driven by transaction cost efficiency and relative cost 
advantage (North 1981, Williamson 1985). Markets expand because their coordination function is 
– under certain conditions – less costly and functionally superior. “Conditions” are the nature of   7
goods, production and transaction processes, but also the dynamics of environmental changes 
(Williamson 1991). In such a theory, the extension of the more efficient market-coordination to in-
frastructures became possible through technological advances saving production but also transac-
tion costs. From this perspective, the state is conceived as a kind of background support structure, 
guaranteeing some important general conditions of market exchange (North 1981).  
3) The property regimes approach conceives privatization as the reconfiguration of property 
rights from public property to private assets. Property rights theorists generally assume that 
common ownership with open access means that individuals lack exclusive rights for the use of 
resources and therefore have less incentive to use them efficiently. The main argument then is that 
whenever it is technically possible to assign private property rights to a thing or resource, it will 
be more efficiently produced, exchanged and used (Alessi 1987). A more refined version of the 
property rights approach emphasizing that property is a complex bundle of rights, which can be 
configured quite differently with each regime creating different incentive structures, has been 
presented by E. Ostrom (Ostrom 2003, Schlager and Ostrom 1992). Some property forms create 
negative externalities or even perverse unintended effects, which again could be averted by a spe-
cific division of rights through some form of public regulation. With respect to the state, this im-
plies that the latter is conceived not only as a more or less passive support structure in the back-
ground, but also as an important inventor and designer of efficient and effective mixed property 
structures (Schneider 2004a).  
4) A more diverse and theoretically less coherent group of political approaches sees the shrinking 
of the state as tactics or strategies of powerful actors (groups, classes, alliances) to redistribute po-
litical power and control. In this case privatization is used by a societal group or class as an in-
strument to strengthen itself and its supporters and to weaken its opponents (Feigenbaum et al. 
1999). Such explanations often refer to the large privatization program of Britain’s Thatcher gov-
ernment, which was interpreted either as a grand strategy to change political culture or ideology 
(i.e., promote popular capitalism) and to change social structures (i.e., increase the number of 
shareholders) to broaden the basis of groups that vote rightist or conservative (Dobek 1993). A re-
lated interpretation was that privatization served to weaken trade unions. However, a recent “po-
litical alliance” based explanation of the Spanish privatization process may also be grouped under 
this theoretical roof (Etchemendy 2004).  
Whereas the first and the last explanation see the retreat of the state – fully or partly – as a po-
litical process, a commonality of the other two approaches is the apolitical nature of this develop-
ment. History in this view is largely efficiency driven and more efficient market-coordination and 
private property regimes will crowd out less efficient systems. Globalization and the expansion of a 
common market are conceived as apolitical “debordering” processes, where different coordination 
mechanisms and property regimes peacefully compete with each other in an ever enlarging and in-
clusive selection environment.  
 
3.1 Globalization  
In the globalization debate this efficiency idea reemerges in a specific form. The argument 
states that intensified international competition over production locations directs capital flows to 
countries where political interference into private property rights and market-coordination is mini-
mal. Under this pressure, the nation-state minimizes regulation (in particular of the labor market) as 
well as the tax burden for its companies. As a consequence, the state withdraws from all forms of 
political interventions, and the power of nation-states to set and achieve autonomous political goals 
becomes increasingly limited (Scharpf and Schmidt 2000, Strange 1996).    8
The compensation hypothesis, in contrast, expects that economic openness does not lead to a 
reduction of the state to its classic basic functions, but rather to an increase in state activity, in par-
ticular when it comes to welfare state policies (Cameron 1978, Rodrik 1998). The deregulation of the 
labor market, which is crucial for international competitiveness, particularly leads to an increased 
demand by a wide array of social groups for protection by the state. This protection occurs by 
means of public employment, unemployment benefits or other social services. The efficiency hy-
pothesis, on the other hand, contends that possibilities of taxation to finance such measures are ex-
tremely restricted by international capital mobility. Which of these processes actually gains the up-
per hand, i.e., the increasing demand for social security or the dwindling capacity of the state to 
satisfy this demand, ultimately remains an empirical question (Verdier and Breen 2001). 
3.2 Europeanization  
In the literature on Europeanization, there also exist competing theories with respect to the ex-
planation of governmental involvement – even very different perspectives about what Europeaniza-
tion really is. In the discussion, various concepts with multiple meanings to describe this phenome-
non have gained support. A recent overview is given by Bulmer (2007). In this context we suggest a 
distinction between four variants (Schneider and Werle 2007): (1) A significant engagement of supra-
national EU actors/institutions in a given policy field, the establishment of genuine European insti-
tutions, and the adoption and execution of European rules in this area. (2) Adjustment and adapta-
tion of domestic actors and institutions in EU member states to policy processes and goals at EU 
level. (3) Institutional convergence among EU countries and adjacent non-member countries (e.g., 
Switzerland or Norway) through horizontal bargaining and interaction. (4) Institutional convergence 
through passive, unilateral policy diffusion, where member states and non-member states simply 
copy or emulate policy programs. 
Europeanization may also be seen as a regional and more intense form of globalization, where 
tighter market integration additionally increases external economic pressure. Economic market inte-
gration (so-called negative integration) not only leads to competition over national production loca-
tions, but also indirectly to competition between regulatory systems and regulation standards 
(Scharpf 1999). Just like the efficiency hypothesis, this theory implies a “race to the bottom” and a 
general reduction of state intervention.  
An opposite trend is predicted by Vaubel (1995). According to his perspective, the national 
governments of the EU can counter the “mutual underbidding” induced by market integration by 
cooperation or majority decisions on the supranational level. Countries with a high level of regula-
tion or taxes attempt to impose their standards on countries with a lower regulatory level by pursu-
ing a “raising rivals’ cost” strategy. Although this hypothesis, like the compensation thesis from the 
globalization literature, assumes a rise of or at least a steady level of state activity, both theories sig-
nificantly differ in terms of the postulated mechanism. This approach postulates that the outcome is 
not necessarily a reduction of social regulation, which in turn would trigger the demand for state 
protection according to the compensation hypothesis. Equally, a dilemma between securing competi-
tiveness and the provision of social protection does not necessarily emerge for governments, because 
they are ultimately able to finance this by means of supranational agreements on taxation without 
endangering the competitiveness of their countries.  
Besides the perspectives that hypothesize positive or negative effects, there is a third variant 
which assumes that the “net effect” of Europeanization is close to zero (Levi-Faur 2004). According 
to this argument, European policies are just one of the possible mechanisms through which countries 
adjust to growing international competitive pressure. Therefore, in the long term, all countries liber-  9
alize and privatize. In a comparison of regulatory reform, Levi-Faur (2003, 2004) shows that similar 
transformation processes also have taken place in Latin America, where all countries challenged by 
international pressure converged to similar institutional configurations. Levi-Faur’s conclusion is 
that major features of liberalization would have diffused to most if not all European member states 
even in the absence of EU-level policymaking. A similar position is held by Bartle (2005), who 
stresses globalization and technical change as major transformative forces and emphasizes that insti-
tutional factors would affect only pace and timing, not the direction of policy change.  
In general, institutionalist approaches make more conditional claims. Similarly to Bartle (2005), 
Schmidt (2002b), for example, suggests that domestic institutional structures, policy styles, prefer-
ences and discourses play an important role in structuring domestic responses to external pressures. 
However, rather than discounting EU policies as one among many mechanisms through which coun-
tries adjust to increased international economic competition, she treats both as independent causal 
factors and identifies their relative importance in accounting for the observed variation in her com-
parative case studies. Many cross-national studies support the institutional hypothesis by highlight-
ing national differences in the various structural reform areas (Thatcher 2004, Vogel 1996). For in-
stance countries such as the UK, in which political power is more concentrated, transformed their 
systems more rapidly and more deeply than countries like Germany and Italy, where political power 
is more dispersed.  
In concluding this theoretical reflection, we can derive the following testable hypotheses. Ac-
cording to the efficiency hypothesis, globalization and Europeanization force national governments 
to transform the infrastructures in private markets because of efficiency considerations. As the EU 
countries are exposed to both regional as well as global economic integration, it is supposed that this 
effect would have been greater in member states than in non-EU states (Verdier and Breen 2001). The 
same effect is predicted by the compensation hypothesis, but in reverse direction. The demand for 
social protection is said to lead to more public employment and thus to greater state involvement in 
infrastructures. In turn, this effect is allegedly more pronounced in EU-countries. The “raising-rivals’ 
costs” hypothesis would also predict a general increase of state activity in the infrastructural areas in 
EU states, which, however, is independent of the extent of economic integration.  
Whether Europeanization has a positive, a negative or no effect at all on state activity is thus a 
question that should be answered by statistical analysis. Before doing so, we will shed more light on 
the differential development of state activity in our sectors between EU and non-EU countries. First 
insights are offered by Figure 4, depicting the evolution of the averages of the infrastructure ratio for 
EU and non-EU countries in the three sectors. The graphs demonstrate a clearly higher level of state 
activity among the EU12 countries at the beginning of the 1980s, but the reduction is considerably 
greater than that of other countries in the following years. If we were to take the year 1983 as a refer-
ence point, we would find a relative reduction. In the EU states, the infrastructure quota had de-
clined by 57 percent up to the end of the time period of analysis, in the non-EU states only by 40 per-
cent. This leads to an average EU infrastructure ratio of 38 percent in the year 2000, which is nine 
percentage points under the average of the non-EU countries. Thus there are some indications that 
Europeanization did indeed intensify the effects of globalization that are forecasted by the efficiency 
hypothesis. At least for the infrastructure sector, the retreat of the state took place more rapidly in EU 
countries than in non-EU countries.    10
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Figure 4: Extent of infrastructure ownership by EU and non-EU countries, 1970-2000 
Our aggregate data therefore agree with the efficiency hypothesis and the “race to the bottom” 
thesis in the Europeanization debate. Our measurements show that the role of the state in society has 
been declining since the early to mid-1980s, but the decrease was particularly severe with regard to 
infrastructure ownership. The EU thus seemed to play – at least in our sectors -a very different role 
in this transformation than it did at Europe’s relaunch in the early 1908s. Contrary to expectations, 
especially with regard to France, the EU was no neomercantilist fortress against the challenging 
world market, but rather supported and amplified global and European market expansion. 
4. An Integrated Explanation  
In this section we take a closer look at the factors that weakened or intensified the withdrawal 
of the state from key infrastructures with the help of statistical methods. After a description of the 
sample of countries, the time frame, and the variables, the results of the regression analyses are pre-
sented. This is followed by a discussion of the conclusions we can draw from the analysis.  
4.1 Data and research design  
The statistical analysis is based on twenty developed democracies in the time period from 1983 
through 2000. Mexico, South Korea, and Turkey, as well as Luxembourg and Iceland, are excluded 
from the analysis because there were no data available for these countries on at least one of the inde-
pendent variables. While we would have preferred a larger sample size, the exclusion of these coun-
tries also has its advantages in terms of an increased homogeneity of the cases pertaining to eco-
nomic development and country size. The United States is not taken into account because its infra-
structural services have always been rendered by privately organized enterprises: it would make 
little sense to incorporate the country into an analysis of the factors that enhance or hamper privati-
zation.  
In considering the time period, we found the early 1980s to be an appropriate starting point be-
cause it represents a period when the effects of globalization supposedly began to intensify (Scharpf 
and Schmidt 2000). The first steps towards reducing state control in the three infrastructure sectors 
were undertaken in 1984. Up to this time, the infrastructure ratio had either remained on a constant   11
level since 1970 or had even increased slightly (only in Portugal and Greece). Data for the dependent 
variable was collected up to the year 2000. At this point, all the countries had initiated at least the 
first few steps towards privatization. On the other hand, it is likely and in some cases even obvious 
that the privatization process was not completed in all the countries in the year 2000. For the ques-
tion at hand this is of secondary importance, however, because we aim to determine which factors 
prompted some countries to privatize early and extensively, while others initiated late and quite 
hesitant privatizations.  
We will apply cross-sectional regressions to answer this question. The data structure of our 
dependent variable is not appropriate for a pooled time-series, since it remained constant over long 
periods of time. Similarly, several of our independent variables are constant or nearly constant over 
extended periods of time. In short, much of the variation in our independent variables is cross-
sectional, which is in line with our interest in identifying country factors that account for the differ-
ing developments in infrastructure ownership across countries. Despite its current popularity, pool-
ing observations across countries and time raises many conceptual and methodological questions 
(Kittel 1999, Kittel and Winner 2005), which are hardly reflected upon in many applications. The use 
of cross-sectional regressions on the relatively small number of cases evidently demands a restriction 
of the number of independent variables, but this disadvantage is compensated for by more transpar-
ency in the interpretation of the results. 
 
4.2 The variables  
As previously mentioned, the dependent variable constitutes the simple mean value of state 
ownership of the respective predominant enterprise in the three infrastructure sectors telecommuni-
cations, electricity, and aviation. In almost all cases privatizations went hand and hand with market 
liberalization and regulatory reforms. As for the Europeanization hypothesis, it is interesting to note 
that the EU never made formal specifications on the privatization of state enterprises for the nation 
states, but only on market liberalization and de-or re-regulation (Pelkmans 2001). National govern-
ments generally regard privatization as a prerequisite to guarantee the competitiveness of the previ-
ously state-run monopoly enterprises after the opening of the market.  
The extent of the withdrawal of the state from the provision of infrastructures is operational-
ized as the decrease of the infrastructure ratio over the entire timeframe of analysis as a percentage of 
its 1983 level. The use of the simple difference between 1983 and 2000 would have had the advantage 
of being easily interpretable, but the base level of the infrastructure ratio is not taken into account by 
this measure. The latter could indeed be added to the statistical analysis as an additional independ-
ent variable, but in light of the limited number of cases, incorporating this information into the de-
pendent variable seems more promising.  
Our major hypothesis is that globalization and Europeanization drive privatization either by 
efficiency pressure or by political or ideological policy harmonization. We measure market pressure 
at global and European level by trade dependence and mobility of capital, as is customary in the 
literature. The sum of exports and imports as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP) 
serves as a measure of the international integration of product and service markets. With respect to 
capital mobility, we make use of the index on the extent of deregulation of the capital markets com-
piled by Quinn (1997).  
We further assume that how the individual countries have reacted to this external pressure 
also depends on domestic political-institutional conditions. One classical theory of political economy 
links economic policy to the party orientation of the government. The party difference hypothesis   12
(Hibbs 1977, Schmidt 1996) generally states that left-oriented governments that are composed of so-
cial-democratic or other left-wing parties promote economic interventions by the state while right-
wing governments, consisting of liberal or conservative parties, put more faith in market forces and 
are as a rule more critical of state “interference” in the economy (Imbeau et al. 2001), and conse-
quently are more likely to be open to neo-liberal thinking. The drastic steps towards liberalization 
and deregulation taken by the neo-liberal conservative governments of Great Britain and the U.S. 
during the 1980s can be regarded as prime examples of this tendency.  
However, the sectoral transformation processes described above shed doubt on the temporally 
invariant validity of the party difference hypothesis. All countries have ultimately taken initial steps 
towards privatization, and it can be assumed that countries with governing left parties were among 
these. Nevertheless, the party difference hypothesis provides some insights to help explain the 
course of privatization. We expect left governments to have sustained the external pressure to adapt 
for a longer period of time than right-wing governments, in particular because the latter had no rea-
son to resist privatization or to force privatization on their own initiative. This leads to the prediction 
that the overall extent of privatization is less in those countries dominated by left-oriented govern-
ments than in those with predominantly right-wing governments.  
The percentage of cabinet seats according to the classification by Schmidt (Schmidt 1996, 
Schmidt 2002a) is used as an indicator for the influence of left parties in the government. A disadvan-
tage of this measure is the assumption that ideology is invariable over time and within families of 
parties. This can be justified by the fact that differences between different groups of parties outweigh 
the differences within these groups. Thus, the classification should only lead to minor measurement 
errors and since relative stability is a characteristic of ideology, changes over time should not carry 
too much weight either.  
Along with pressure and motivation for reforms, a political system’s capacity for action must 
be taken into account. This is determined, in particular, by the structural and institutional context in 
which governments act. On the one hand, these are formal norms, which are codified in the constitu-
tion or in laws and lead directly or indirectly to restrictions in the governing parties’ ability to act. On 
the other hand, these are more informal structures of the interest group system and their relation-
ships to parties and governmental bodies, which make certain policies possible, but also impede oth-
ers (see e.g. Häge 2003).  
Institutional restrictions are said to have a negative impact on the overall capacity for policy 
change (Schmidt 1996). Therefore, the privatization process should be of lesser magnitude as the 
institutional constraints of the government’s capacity to act become greater. An interesting formal 
theory about institutional restrictions was presented by Tsebelis (2002) in the form of the veto player 
concept. Its explanatory power in this context, however, is disputed (Bauer et al. 2004). In line with 
other comparable studies (Huber et al. 1993, Schmidt 1996) we will instead focus on institutional 
restrictions. An index developed by Schmidt (1996) takes into account the legal anchoring of the 
status quo, the autonomy of the central bank, policy making by referendum and the structure of the 
state. An additional constraining factor for Schmidt is EU membership, but this effect is examined 
separately in this analysis. The score for EU membership was thus taken out of the indicator.  
With respect to the structure of organized interests, we distinguish between pluralist and cor-
poratist systems (Schmitter and Lehmbruch 1979). Pluralist systems are characterized by a multitude 
of more or less weakly organized interest groups, which compete among each other for access to 
political decision makers. Strong societal opposition to governmental policies cannot be expected in 
such cases. Corporatist systems, on the other hand, are marked by a few tightly organized and pow-
erful interest groups, which are linked to state actors by long-term exchange relationships. The ef-  13
fects of these systems are disputed. On the one hand, state capacity could be increased by policies 
that are aligned with interest groups. On the other hand, however, such concentrated actions are 
normally based on bargaining between state actors and interest groups, which often complicates the 
uncompromised pursuit of interests and preferences.  
The fact that unions generally assume a very powerful role in such cooperative relations is also 
worth mentioning (Garrett 1998, Swank 2002). Their affiliation with the political left implies that cor-
poratist systems hinder rather than enhance privatization. Thus, corporatist countries are expected to 
have privatized to a lesser extent than pluralist countries. As a measure of levels of corporatism, the 
index developed by Siaroff (1999) is used. It is based on a battery of indicators, which tend to even 
out individual measurement errors. Finally, we account for the possible effect of public debt, as it has 
been argued that governments of any partisan complexion are likely to respond to severe fiscal prob-
lems with “selling off the ‘family silver’” (Obinger and Zohlnhöfer 2005).  
The independent variables are incorporated into the analysis in different ways according to 
theoretical and methodological considerations. Since a temporal relationship is predicted for the 
globalization variables, the change over the period of analysis was calculated. The scores for trade 
dependence and capital market integration demonstrate an increasing trend, such that the danger of 
an ecological fallacy through the use of the change in variables is relatively small. With regard to 
trade dependence, we also account for different base levels by using the percentage change of the 
measure. As for the variable for financial market integration, using the percentage change makes less 
sense. The index for the deregulation of financial markets (Quinn 1997) is a compilation of three 
components that each allow for only very few values. It is thus questionable whether the percentage 
change of this indicator allows for an interpretation at all. While the change over the general study 
period is calculated for trade integration, the change from 1980 through 1997 is used for financial 
market deregulation. On the one hand, this is done because data for financial market deregulation is 
only available for up to the end of 1997; on the other hand, the temporal shift reduces the danger that 
the values of this variable are themselves determined by other independent variables in the model. 
In the end, financial market deregulation is also an output-variable of the political system. A possible 
endogeneity problem is therefore omitted.  
For the government ideology and corporatism variables, the mean values over time are calcu-
lated. As the scores of these variables fluctuate in both directions over the period, it does not make 
sense to use their change over time. The variable for the institutional constraints of the central gov-
ernment is constant over time and is thus taken into account in the analysis in its unchanged form. 
As an indicator for the ramifications of European integration, a dummy-variable was constructed, 
which takes the value one, if the country at hand was a member of the EU in the mid 1990s, and oth-
erwise the score zero. The membership of the last three members of the EU 15 (i.e., Austria, Finland 
and Sweden) was in our view too short to have a noteworthy effect on their privatization records. To 
avoid a possible endogeneity problem with regard to privatization receipts and public debt, we used 
the maximum debt during the period between 1980 and 1997. Since it is unlikely that fiscal problems 
translate into privatizations in the short term, we restricted the time period for identifying the maxi-
mum debt to years before 1998. 
4.3 Modeling the impact of Europeanization  
In the following, we will present the results of our analysis. Table 1 illustrates the results of 
cross-sectional regressions of the extent of privatization using different combinations of the inde-
pendent variables.  
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Table 1: Determinants of infrastructure privatization  
 
Dependent variable: Privatization  (∆ 1983-2000 in %)   
              
  20 Countries          19 Coutries 
           (without  Spain) 
Model   1 2  3 4  5a 5b 
 
Ideology of the  
government   -0.369     -0.499*   -0.381   -0.490**   -0.662***  
(Ø 1983-2000)   (1.28)     (1.92)   (1.55)   (2.40)   (3.73)  
Corporatism   -4.906  
 
-6.211   -4.183  
  
(Ø 1983-2000)   (0.70)     (1.06)   (0.74)      
Institutional  
        
Constraints   1.751     0.488       
(constant)   (0.32)     (0.10)        
Public Debt   -0.033     0.088       
(max 1980-1997)   (0.15)     (0.41)        
EU Membership   25.148*   30.596**  
 
23.979**   24.571**   18.297**  
(Member before 1995)   (1.94)   (2.80)     (2.20)   (2.56)   (2.24)  
Financial Market  
        
Deregulation   -1.931   -3.189     -2.078     
(∆ 1980-1997 absolute)   (0.66)   (1.44)     (0.82)      
Trade dependence   -0.042   0.062  
     
(∆ 1983-2000 in %)   (0.15)   (0.27)          
R-Square   0.49   0.35   0.31   0.48   0.45   0.59  
Adjusted R-Square   0.19   0.23   0.13   0.34   0.39   0.54  
 
Notes: Results of OLS-regressions, absolute t-values in parentheses; * significant on the 10 percent level, ** significant 
on the 5 percent level, *** significant on the 1 percent level; all twosided tests; models 5b shows the results for models 
5a without the outlying case Spain.  
Model 1 contains the estimated results for all the explanatory factors discussed in the preced-
ing section. Neither financial market deregulation nor trade integration show a statistically signifi-
cant effect on the extent of privatization. Among the external factors, only the coefficient for EU 
membership corresponds with the expectations in terms of direction and statistical significance. As 
for the domestic factors, institutional constraints and corporatist arrangements can also be ruled out 
as explanatory factors. Political party orientation also does not show a significant effect, but its t-
statistic is still of such a size that it warrants further investigation. Indeed, when we run two different 
models, one incorporating external (model 2) and another incorporating only domestic factors   15
(model 3), government ideology shows a significant effect in the latter, while the results for the for-
mer model are basically the same as for the full model, except that the t-statistic for financial deregu-
lation increases to some extent. For the remaining models, we only retained those independent vari-
ables with a t-score greater than one. Due to the small number of cases, a maximally parsimonious 
model is desirable. This also provides us with insights about the stability of the remaining relation-
ships. Model 4 shows an intermediate step and model 5a the most parsimonious model. While the 
coefficient of EU membership is slightly smaller, party influence shows a larger and clearer effect in 
the reduced model. The explanation of the extent of privatization can thus ultimately be reduced to 
two influential factors: the ideology of the government and Europeanization.  
Further support for the influence of party ideology can be drawn from model 5b. This model 
replicates the regression for model 5a but excludes Spain from the calculations, which emerged as a 
severe outlier from the regression diagnostics. As the Spanish case is characterized by almost com-
plete privatization through left wing governments (which is still a puzzle in political research where 
different explanations compete, see for instance Etchemendy 2004), this is clearly deviant from the 
overall pattern. Spain’s privatization process thus exerted an unjustifiably strong influence on the 
results of the analysis. Indeed, the coefficients and t-statistics of all independent variables change 
when Spain is excluded, but most notably the party ideology of government shows a highly signifi-
cant effect already in the full model. A comparison of the R-square statistics between the models 
based on all countries and those without Spain also makes it clear how sensitive this yardstick is to-
wards individual outliers. The adjusted R-square of 0.39 in Model 5a increases to 0.54 in model 5b if 
Spain is left out, which reflects considerable explanatory power for a model with just two independ-
ent variables. 
The results of the analysis are visualized in Figure 5.  In view of the preceding discussion, the 
graph is based on Model 5b in Table 1. The essential factors of influence on the extent of infrastruc-
ture privatization are, accordingly, the ideological orientation of the government as well as member-
ship in the EU. Figure 5 is a scatter-plot of the dependent variable against the average proportion of 
left parties in the cabinet. Non-EU-12 countries are abbreviated with lower-case letters and EU-12 
countries with capital letters. The lines print the predicted values conditional on EU membership, 
with the upper line referring to the EU-12 and the lower line to the non-EU countries. The slope of 
the lines reflects the party effect and the vertical distance between the lines illustrates the effect of 
EU-membership.  
As indicated by the difference in the height of the intercepts of the two lines, the extent of pri-
vatization was more than 18 percentage points higher in EU member states than in non-member 
states. Also, the extent of privatization in both groups of countries is approximately 0.66 percentage 
points less for each percentage point of cabinet positions that were on average held by left parties 
during the period. Of course, such estimates merit caution. The graph illustrates that individual cases 
deviate significantly from the predicted scores. For instance, Great Britain and Australia have privat-
ized more extensively than the model would have led us to believe, whereas Switzerland experi-
enced an unusually low level of privatization for its combination of values on the independent vari-
ables. This sheds some light on the uncertainties which must be taken into account in the interpreta-
tion of the statistical analyses. However, the objective of this analysis is not to offer point estimates 
for individual countries, but rather to identify empirical relationships which allow for limited gener-
alizations.    16
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Figure 5: Graphic representation of the results of the regression  
Even if the exact size of the effects depends on many circumstances, the relative robustness 
and clarity of the relationships seem to justify the conclusion that the privatization of infrastructures 
tended to be more extensive in EU states and countries in which the government consisted of right-
wing parties than in non-EU states and countries with governments dominated by the left (for 
somewhat contrasting results see Obinger and Zohlnhöfer 2005). The clear difference between the 
privatization in EU and non-EU countries is also depicted in Figure 5 above, where the mean state 
ownership across the three sectors is plotted against time for EU member and non-member states. 
Both groups of countries began privatizing in the mid 1980s. Although the non-EU countries started 
on a lower level of state ownership, their privatization efforts were far less pronounced than those in 
EU countries. In the next section, we will discuss how these findings can be interpreted and possibly 
integrated into a wider empirical and theoretical framework. 
4.4 Interpretation  
A major result of our analysis is that we could not find any noticeable direct effects of global-
ization on the privatization of infrastructures. Although internationalization of the economy has 
greatly increased in general over the period of analysis, privatization was introduced only relatively 
late in den 80s and 90s. Our regression analysis shows that the extent of privatization did not sys-
tematically vary with the degree of trade integration or financial market deregulation. However, our 
results are largely in line with the Europeanization hypothesis: EU countries privatized their infra-
structures to a greater degree. Yet the higher level of economic integration of the EU once again does 
not seem to be the factor that induced the member states to privatize through competition pressure. 
Rather, it seems to be political decisions on the supranational level, which are geared directly at insti-
tutional changes towards more market and competition in national infrastructure sectors that lead to 
privatizations.  
However, our analysis only examined the factors that enhanced or hindered privatization. An 
explanation of how this wave of privatization came about cannot be provided by the statistical   17
analysis. A negative correlation between globalization and the extent of privatization could have 
been taken as evidence that the internationalization of markets not only pushed ahead privatization, 
but -in line with the theory -also triggered this development. However, since no relationship could 
be detected this explanation is not very plausible. Furthermore, international market integration was 
already continually increasing during the 1970s, which did not result in any privatizations at this 
time.  
To arrive at a more encompassing explanation of infrastructure privatizations, we must turn to 
more subtle factors. The strong effect of government ideology suggests that norms, beliefs and cogni-
tive policy models may play an important role. From such a perspective, the general retreat of the 
state from public infrastructures can only be traced back to changed conditions in foreign trade and 
investments in a very indirect way. Globalization constituted only one of the reasons to justify the 
spread of the neo-liberal model for the political economy. It seems plausible that the privatization 
wave was not triggered and enhanced by a certain degree of international market integration, but 
instead by changes in “belief systems” (Sabatier 1987), “policy paradigms” (Hall 1993) or “dis-
courses” (Schmidt 2002a), as emphasized in the literature on the influence of ideas on public policies 
(for an overview see Campbell 2002).  
A paradigmatic change in economics also played an essential role in the emergence of this new 
policy model. As a response to Keynesianism, theoretical arguments focusing on the difficulties or 
even the ineffectiveness of state intervention in the economy emerged during the 1970s. In short, 
alternative proposals demanded less state intervention and more market freedom. The absorption 
and often distorted adaptation of these ideas into policy (Henisz et al. 2005) led to the emergence of a 
new theoretical framework to conceptualize the overall political economy. We do not only argue that 
the discourse prevailing in a certain political system or changes therein affect the capability of gov-
ernments to react to “objective” external economic pressures (see, e.g., Schmidt 2002a), but also that 
these economic problems are only recognized as such in the light of a certain policy paradigm. The 
international diffusion of this new paradigm is then the actual trigger of reforms of the state, not only 
a mediating factor affecting the extent and timing of transformations.  
From a theoretical standpoint, it can be excluded that this was a purely rational or even 
bounded rational learning or lesson drawing process as theorized in the literature on policy transfer 
(Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, Rose 1993). Infrastructures are based on long-term investments whose 
effectiveness can only be judged on a long-term basis. However, very few reliable empirical studies 
on the effects of privatization over time and the transformation of infrastructural sectors in general 
exist at this point in time (Bauer 2003, 2004). For instance, systematic evaluations on the British priva-
tization process had been published only in the early 1990s (Miller 1995). Thus, political actors usu-
ally privatized without the possibility to weigh the performance of the new policy model against the 
traditional mode of infrastructures being provided by the state. Enormous expenditures to auction 
off new telecommunications licenses, bottleneck in the energy supplies in the U.S., as well as security 
problems in the British railroad network are only a few examples that shed doubt on the long-term 
efficiency and overall superiority of privately organized as opposed to public infrastructure provi-
sion. From a long-term economic perspective, the possibility that an inferior path of institutional 
development was chosen cannot be ruled out entirely (Arthur 1994).  
Accordingly, the extent to which political actors adopted these new rules of the game de-
pended on how well they supported or could be brought into line with the existing cognitive frame 
and action orientation of the actors. A useful way to analyze this “ideational” level is offered by Sa-
batier (1987) with his concept of “policy belief systems” (see also Schneider and Janning 2006), which 
distinguishes between the main core, policy core and secondary aspects. The main core contains fun-  18
damental normative and ontological axioms, e.g., on the nature of human beings, an evaluation of 
the priority of different values or the characteristics of distributive justice. Furthermore, it spans all 
policy areas. The policy core comprises the strategies applied to implement the concepts of values of 
the main core within a certain policy area, while the secondary aspects refer primarily to the ade-
quate pursuit of these strategies by means of concrete administrative and legislative measures. The 
extent to which elements of one’s action orientation can now be changed depends on the abstractness 
of the structural category to which they belong. Change in one’s core convictions is thus less prob-
able than in the secondary aspects of the practical implementation of these objectives. Changes in the 
belief system are assumed to come about through instrumental learning. In practice, this means that 
information that sheds doubt on existing basic ideas is rejected and scientific analyses are primarily 
used to support one’s own principles and beliefs or to attack those of one’s political opponent.  
For liberal and conservative parties, whose core convictions traditionally include the idea of a 
limited role of the state in the economy, adopting the neo-liberal infrastructure model was not a dif-
ficult task: it confirmed their assessment that the market is generally superior to the state as a coordi-
nation mechanism. They adopted the general idea of an infrastructure sector marked by competition 
very early into their policy core and forced their implementation by means of the instruments rec-
ommended by economists, which also entailed state regulation to create and safeguard competition. 
The radical forms of liberalization and deregulation by the so-called neo-conservatives under the 
Thatcher government in Great Britain and the Reagan administration in the United States in the late 
1970s and early 1980s are the prime examples of this belief driven process.  
Left parties, however, had and still have greater difficulties in conforming to this model be-
cause they generally exhibit more trust in state regulation than in economic self-regulation by means 
of market mechanisms. However, the more this policy model spread and the greater the consensus 
over its comparative advantages grew, the greater the pressure became on the remaining govern-
ments, who had yet to adopt this model in their countries. In other words, the diffusion of this policy 
paradigm was based on frequency-dependent “positive feedbacks” (Pierson 2004, Witt 1989). Ulti-
mately, left governments also privatized, but more hesitantly and not as extensively. Due to the con-
siderable difference between the core beliefs of left-oriented parties and the new structural con-
straints within global and European competition, it was difficult for them to accept neo-liberal pro-
posals as a political strategy. The party effect on the extent of privatization, which was identified in 
the analysis, can therefore be traced back to the degree of consistency between the new policy model 
and the government parties’ traditional action orientation.  
The effect of EU membership can also be interpreted in a similar vein. The European Commis-
sion played a decisive role here. As early as the 1980s it had emerged as a motor for liberalization 
and deregulation of the infrastructure sectors (Bartle 2005, Grande 1996, Schmidt 1998, Schneider et 
al. 1994). Based on its institutional self-interest, it had a motive to adopt and spread the new eco-
nomic model, as it entailed an enormous extension of its authority and thus consolidation of its posi-
tion in the institutional structure of the EU. Cognitive restrictions did not pose a problem here, since 
the main task of the Commission since the end of the 1980s was the creation and completion of a 
common internal market according to the neo-liberal paradigm. Thanks to its role as an “agenda 
setter” in the policymaking process of the EU and its ability to lay down secondary law, it had the 
capacity to actively promote the implementation of these ideas in the member states (Schmidt 2000). 
Thus, the effect of EU membership can be attributed to a combination of the cognitive predisposition 
of the European Commission towards the new policy model as well as its institutional possibilities of 
supporting and enforcing policy transfer throughout Europe (Radaelli 2000).  
In summary, privatizations in the infrastructure sector cannot be directly traced back to in-  19
creased international market integration, but rather to existing and changing attitudes towards the 
neo-liberal policy model. International competition over production locations is therefore only of 
significance to the extent that it is drawn on to support the claim that privatizing infrastructures is 
economically necessary. As the analysis has shown, ideological rhetoric plays a greater role than the 
actual extent of economic openness of a country. This also becomes evident when we take into ac-
count that there is hardly any empirical evidence of the supposed positive effects of the restructuring 
on the efficiency and the effectiveness of the infrastructure sectors (Bauer 2003, 2004). Thus, we can 
hardly speak of a rational reaction to changing structural conditions in the international economy.  
The discussion has shown that the possibilities of changing action orientations through social 
learning processes and the diffusion of ideas cannot be neglected, particularly when analyzing politi-
cal and economic contexts from a long-term perspective. The conceptualization and methodological 
investigation of such diffusion processes, particularly in quantitative studies, points to more ques-
tions still to be answered. 
5. Conclusion  
This paper set out to investigate whether the state is really undergoing a process of transforma-
tion as currently debated and if so, to what extent Europeanization is driving this process. First, we 
discussed some conceptual and measurement problems encountered when facing the question 
whether or not the state is on the retreat. We opted for two indicators for describing the changing 
power of the state over time: the state expenditure and the infrastructure ownership ratios. The latter 
measure is based on original data recently collected for twenty-six OECD countries over a time pe-
riod of thirty years (1970 to 2000). Both measures showed that the role of the state in society has been 
declining since the early to mid-1980s, but the decrease was especially severe with regard to infra-
structure ownership. This is particularly strong evidence for the transformation of the state, since 
infrastructure provision was long regarded as one of its core functions. However, while all countries 
made some steps towards privatizing infrastructure property, the extent to which this happened 
varied considerably across countries. Thus, the descriptive analysis showed that the state’s role in 
society declined considerably over the last two decades, at least in terms of government spending 
and infrastructure ownership, although to different degrees across countries.  
We then turned to the different approaches and theories advanced in the literature to account 
for this phenomenon. It is often argued that factors of the regional and international environment of 
states influence their roles and power positions; and that domestic political structure, beliefs and 
preferences mitigate this effect. Based on this theoretical review, we derived hypotheses about the 
effects of Europeanization and globalization, as well as domestic factors such as institutional con-
straints, corporatist arrangements, and government ideology. The statistical analysis showed that 
government ideology and Europeanization had strong and significant relationships to the extent of 
infrastructure privatization, while the coefficients for globalization and other domestic factors were 
insignificant. Therefore, the main conclusion from the statistical analysis is that Europeanization 
promoted infrastructure privatization while left parties in the government where rather reluctant to 
privatize state-owned infrastructure companies.  
However, it is important to stress that any statistical analysis can at best demonstrate changes 
in a certain phenomenon, not for its origin. In this respect, our statistical results say something about 
the varying degrees of privatization, but not about what started the wave of privatization in the first 
place. We argued that its origin lies in a changing paradigm of economics, the advent of neo-liberal 
thinking in the seventies. The diffusion of these ideas among political actors is conditioned by their 
existing belief system. If a person has strong cognitive priors conflicting with a certain idea, it will 
harder to convince them to adopt that idea. We argued that this explanation can account for our em-  20
pirical findings that Europeanization and government ideology affect the degree of privatization of 
infrastructure companies. Right-wing politicians were happy to incorporate neo-liberal prescriptions 
into their policy views as it was providing them with ostensibly scientific justifications for similar 
ideas. A similar picture can be drawn for the European Commission. During the late eighties and the 
nineties, a primary way to advance its own institutional powers was to implement the economic 
program enshrined in the Single European Act, which is to a considerable extent based on neo-liberal 
ideas and therefore accounts for the positive effect of Europeanization on infrastructure privatiza-
tion.  
What does all this mean for the question set out in the beginning of the paper? Is the state 
really on the retreat? According to our indicators, the answer is yes. But as already mentioned, this 
does not necessarily mean a declining role of the state in society.  
It could simply be the case that direct and obvious state interventions as reflected in public 
employment, expenditure and infrastructure provision are replaced by more indirect and less visible 
means of control such as regulation. And even if we take the current retreat of the state as granted, 
our analysis has pointed out that there is nothing inevitable and irreversible about this trend. It is all 
man-made. Coming back to our comparison with the global warming debate, there are still skeptics 
arguing that there were always long term cycles in temperature rises and falls and therefore it is too 
early to conclude that global warming really exists. A similar argument can be made with regard to 
the coming end of the state. We may simply be at the bottom of a long cycle of pro/contra-
government feelings at the moment and the trend could possibly reverse in future. Recent events, 
ranging from election outcomes in many South American states, mass-demonstrations of disillu-
sioned youths at WTO and G7 meetings, to the rejections of the EU constitutional treaty in the Neth-
erlands and France, might be indications that the neo-liberal consensus is crumbling indeed.  
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Data Appendix  
Proportion of infrastructure     
Description: 
Mean value of the proportion of state ownership of the respective pre-
dominant enterprise in the infrastructure sectors telecommunications, elec-
tricity and aviation.  
Calculation:  Proportion of infrastructure =  (TSO7000 + ESO7000 + ASO7000) / 3 
Original name of variable:  TSO7000, ESO7000, ASO7000 
Source:   Schneider et al. (2004) 
 
Proportion of state expenditures  
 
Description:  Total expenditures of the state as a percentage of GDP 
Calculation: 
Proportion of state expenditures = YPGTO or 186  
(only GBR, GRC, IRE, DEN), Switzerland extrapolated to 2000  
Original name of variable:  YPGTQ, 186 
Source:   OECD (2002, 2002a) 
 
Privatization 
 
Description: 
Change of proportion of infrastructure in percentage points between 1983 
and 2000 in absolute scores  
Calculation: 
Privatization = | (Proportion of infrastructure [2000] – Proportion of infra-
structure [1983]) * 100 / Proportion of infrastructure  [1983]  
Original name of variable:  Proportion of infrastructure  
Source:   See proportion of infrastructure  
 
Ideology of the government  
 
Description: 
Percentage of left parties in the cabinet according to the classification by 
Schmidt (1996) 
Calculation:  Ideology of the government = mean value for 18 years (1983-2000) 
Original name of variable:  GOVLEFT 
Source:   Armingeon et al. (2002)   25
Institutional restrictions 
Description:  Additive Index for institutional restrictions cf. Schmidt (1996) 
Calculation: 
Institutional restrictions = IBEGR - 1 if the country was an EU-member for 
more than half of the timeframe 1960-1990  
Original name of variable:  IBEGR 
Source:   Armingeon et al. (2002) 
 
Corporatism 
 
Description:  Index for the economic integration according to Siaroff (1999) 
Calculation: 
Corporatism = INTEGR, in which scores between 1980 and 1990 and be-
tween 1990 and 1995 were interpolated (for SPA, POR and GRC, the scores 
of 1990 was used for scores before 1990), and for scores between 1995 and 
2000, the score from 1995 was used.  
Original name of variable:  INTEGR 
Source:   Armingeon (2002) 
 
EU-Membership  
 
Description:  Member of the EU in the year 1995  
Calculation: EU-Membership   = 1 if EUMG[1995]  = 2 
Original name of variable:  EUMG 
 
Public Debt 
 
Description:  Gross government debt as a percentage of GDP 
Calculation:  Public Debt = maximum of debt[1980-1997] 
Original name of variable:  Debt 
Source:   Armingeon et al. (2005) 
 
Deregulation of financial markets  
Description: 
Index for the extent of deregulation of financial markets according to 
Quinn (1997) 
Calculation:  Financial market deregulation = OPENNESS[1997] - OPENNESS[1980] 
Original name of variable:  OPENNESS 
Source:   Armingeon (2002) 
 
Trade dependence  
 
Description:  Sum of exports and imports as a percentage of the gross domestic product  
Calculation: 
Trade dependence = (IMEX[2000] – IMEX[1983]) *  
100 / IMEX[1983] 
Original name of variable:  IMEX 
Source:   Armingeon (2002) 
 